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INTRODUCTION

From time to time, the Supreme Court chooses to hear a case addressing a
family law issue. The family law cases accepted by the Supreme Court almost
always present a constitutional challenge because absent a constitutional
question, state law governs family law. Because the Supreme Court controls
its docket, it is free to select only those cases that, in the view of the Court,
pose particularly challenging issues. On most occasions, the Court chooses
only those family law cases that present other, unrelated issues of interest to
the Court.
Within family law, these Supreme Court cases can raise more questions than
they answer. These cases resolve family law issues without much attention to
family law's well-developed dialogue on the particular topic at issue. The
Supreme Court frequently resolves deeply contested questions in other areas of
law.' But because the Supreme Court tends to review family law cases only
when they contain an issue of interest independent of the family law question,
her
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I thank Kimberly R. Fox for
helpful research assistance.
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civil rights demonstrations, and abortion).
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the Court can shut off debate in family law cases almost unwittingly,
seemingly without the benefit of experience with the arguments in the field.
For example, the Supreme Court identified the fundamental right to marry in
two cases, Loving v. Virginia2 and Zablocki v. Redhail.3 Guaranteeing this

right, however, created complicated questions for state marriage laws, which
strictly restrict the entry into legal marriage. 4 In both Loving and Zablocki, the
Supreme Court did not exhibit real awareness of state regulations or provide
guidance on how these regulations should interact with this new right. Instead,
the Court addressed the important questions of race and the Constitution in
Loving,5 and poverty and the Constitution in Zablocki.6 The Court did not
discuss the family law implications of recognizing a fundamental right to
marry in either case. 7 This omission of the family law discussion may have
stemmed from a lack of familiarity with family law issues.
Like the cases declaring a fundamental right to marry, the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence on the constitutional status of paternity exemplifies the results of
limited experience with family law cases. This Comment looks at one such
recent case, Miller v. Albright,8 to illustrate the problem of the Court's lack of
familiarity with family law. 9 Miller v. Albright raised questions about the
constitutional rights of aliens, questions that have long interested legal scholars
focused on immigration issues. However, the case also contained a question of

gender equality within the context of parental relationships. Apparently, the
2

388 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing marriage as one of the "basic civil rights of man").

1 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding a statute that restricted access to marriage to a parent
with unpaid child support obligations unconstitutional).
4 As long as the state has taken the role of licensing marriage, which did not become
widespread for all marrying couples until the nineteenth century, they have imposed
restrictions on the age, health, sex, race, and number of individuals who may enter a
marriage. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAw 77-118 (3d ed. 1998).
5 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-12.
6 See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 388-90.
7 For example, in Zablocki, the Court did not clarify whether the fundamental right to
marry encompasses a right to a state-issued marriage license, as the Court's opinion appears
to suggest. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 377. Margaret Brinig has made a similar point. See
Margaret Brinig, The Supreme Court's Impact on Marriage, 1967-90, 41 How. L.J. 271
(1998) (noting that family law cases before the Supreme Court raise constitutional issues
and that "the Court does not approach these cases from a family law perspective."). This
complicated issue was worthy of clarification both because most rights do not encompass
the requirement of affirmative acts by the state, and also because state licensing of marriage
is not a practice with a deep historical tradition; religious institutions set the true "law" of
marriage throughout most of its history at common law. Nonetheless, there is no evidence
that the Court thought about the issue. Instead, the Court focused on discrimination against
the poor, using a fundamental right to marriage as a vehicle for its point.
8 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
9 For a discussion of the Court's failure to take a family law approach to a range of cases,
see generally Brinig, supra note 7.
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resolution of this family law issue appeared less complicated to the Court than
it would have to practitioners and scholars of family law.
The United States Supreme Court decided Miller, the most recent in a series
of paternity cases addressing the rights of unwed fathers, in June of 1998.10
Miller raised a gender-based equal protection challenge to a statute that
automatically gives United States citizenship to the child born of an unmarried
American woman abroad, but not to the child born of an unmarried American
man abroad unless the father takes a series of affirmative steps to acknowledge
and support his child.'1 Judging by the published commentary on the case, it
has drawn attention almost exclusively from scholars interested in immigration
and naturalization issues, 12 and no attention whatsoever from family law
scholars.
The Supreme Court addressed Miller as a case about the extent of
congressional power over immigration, a much-debated issue. Yet the Miller
case also raised a number of issues that are persistently explored in family law
practice and literature, but do not routinely come to the attention of the
Supreme Court. Those issues include: (1) distinguishing a right held by one
individual family member from a right held by two or more family members
10 The other cases in the series include Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
(holding that a statute denying paternity rights to the putative father of a child born to a
mother who is married to a different man does not violate due process); Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248 (1983) (holding that an unwed father who does not participate substantially in
child-rearing is not entitled to hearing rights under the due process clause); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1978) (invoking equal protection for divorced but actively
involved father and mother in step-parent adoption proceedings); Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434
U.S. 246 (1978) (holding that an unwed father is not entitled to the same treatment as a
divorced father under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), and
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that unwed fathers are entitled to a hearing
on their parental fitness).
" See Miller, 523 U.S. at 421.
12 See, e.g., Ranjana Natarajan, Amerasians and Gender-Based Equal Protection Under
U.S. Citizenship Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 123 (1998) (applying the equal
protection principles set forth in Miller v. Albright to the exclusion of Filipino Amerasians
form the Amerasian Immigration Amendments); Debra L. Satinoff, Sex-Based
Discriminationin U.S. ImmigrationLaw: The High Court's Lost Opportunity to Bridge the
Gap Between What We Say and What We Do, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1353 (1998) (criticizing
the Court's failure to set meaningful precedent regarding gender-based immigration law);
Collin O'Connor Udell, Miller v. Albright: Plenary Power, Equal Protection,and the Rights
of an Alien Love Child, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 621 (1998) (discussing the clash in Miller v.
Albright between the plenary powers doctrine and the equal protection clause); The Supreme
Court, 1997 Term - Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 202-12 (1998) (providing an
overview of Miller v. Albright and discussing the imposition of constitutional norms on
Congress's plenary power); see also Nikki Ahrenholz, Comment,, Miller v. Albright:
Continuing to Discriminate on the Basis of Gender and Illegitimacy, 76 DENy. U. L. REV.
281 (1998) (examining Miller v. Albright's discriminatory effect on illegitimate alien
children).
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when the law aims to protect a relationship between two individuals; (2)
applying a formal constitutional framework for equality in an area of human
experience with profoundly embedded gender roles that at times implicate
biological differences; and (3) distinguishing a question of individual right
from a question of responsibility within the family.
This Comment examines the Miller case from a family law perspective. It
seeks to demonstrate how the Court might have debated and defined the key
issues differently had the various actors in the case focused more on the
relevant family law issues and practices. Part I briefly describes the Miller
litigation. Part II discusses the decisive issue of whether the daughter had
standing to assert her father's rights, and offers an approach to that issue
familiar to family law scholars but not addressed in the Miller litigation. This
family law approach puts the father-daughter relationship itself at the center of
the analysis in the belief that one cannot meaningfully separate the interests of
the individuals from one another in some family law cases. Part III discusses
the case's equal protection issue. It first explores the challenges parenting
poses to an equal protection jurisprudence that relies upon the comparison of
similarly situated individuals. It then asks whether the unique circumstances
of parenting, where responsibilities and rights are not effectively distinguished,
complicate the issue of parental rights. The Comment concludes by cautioning
against the constitutionalization of family law issues.
I. THE MILLER CASE
The facts of Miller are straightforward. Lorelyn Miller was born in the
Philippines of a Filipino mother. 13 Her father was, at the time of her
conception, a U.S. serviceman stationed in the Philippines.1 4 He returned to
the United States before Lorelyn Miller was born, and never acknowledged her
existence until she applied for citizenship based on the fact that her father was
a United States citizen.15 Because Lorelyn Miller applied for citizenship after
her twenty-first birthday, the government denied her citizenship, relying on a
statute requiring her to apply before she turned twenty-one. 16 Lorelyn Miller's
father, now seeking a relationship with his adult daughter, cooperated in the
17
ensuing litigation, which sought to establish her right to citizenship.
The Constitution grants citizenship to those born within the United States.
The Fourteenth Amendment grants this citizenship to persons born in the
United States, provided the individual is also subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. 18 This constitutional citizenship, called jus soli citizenship,
derives from the physical location of the individual's birth. It is the common
13See Miller, 523 U.S. at 425.
14 See id.
15See id.
16See id.
"7See id.

18See U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
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law form of citizenship. 19 Another form of citizenship, jus sanguinis
citizenship, is passed through bloodlines. This form of citizenship stems from
to be the citizen
the Roman and civil law tradition, which considered a person
20
United States
birth.
of
place
his
of
regardless
nation,
of his parents'
citizenship law employs both concepts of citizenship, as do most nations in
21
some form or another. There is a second form of statutory22 citizenship, not
relevant to the Miller case, acquired through naturalization. While jus soli
citizenship is granted in the Constitution, all jus sanguinis citizenship is
statutory. Because Congress thus creates the right to jus sanguinis citizenship,
Congress can likewise modify or restrict this right. The portion of this
statutory citizenship provision that was challenged in Miller v. Albright only
governs a small fraction of cases, namely, the conferral of citizenship on
and one of whom
children born of unmarriedparents, one of whom is a citizen
23
States.
United
the
of
outside
born
is
child
is not, when that
The Miller plaintiff challenged Section 309 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.24 This provision provides automatic citizenship to illegitimate
children who are born outside of the United States to mothers with United
States citizenship. 25 The Act also grants citizenship to foreign-born
illegitimate children of fathers with United States citizenship; however, unlike
the treatment of children born of American mothers, this grant of citizenship is
not automatic. Rather, the father and child must meet a series of requirements
prior to the child's qualifying for citizenship. In the Miller case, the most
relevant requirement was that before the child turned eighteen, the father must
have acknowledged his paternity or a competent court must have adjudicated
his paternity. 26 Under this statute, once the child passes the age limit, the
19

546
See Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Dual Nationality and Election, 30 YALE L.J. 545,

(1921) (discussing jus soli and jus sanguinis principles as the rule of citizenship in the

United States, England, and other countries).
20 See id. at 546.
Citizenship, 268
21 See Martin L. Rothstein, Acquisition and Loss of United States
in United States
principles
PLI/Lrr 483, 485 (1984) (discussing jus soli and jus sanguinis
immigration).
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1409.
23 See Miller 523 U.S. at 421.
24 See id.. at 428.
25

See id.

Although Lorelyn Miller was actually subject to an earlier version of the Act requiring
than
that the father meet his statutory obligations before the child turned twenty-one rather
Act.
the
of
version
either
under
requirements
the
meet
not
did
eighteen, Lorelyn
The fuller text of section 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act reads as follows:
title, and of
(a) The provisions of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), and (g) of section 1401 of this
apply as
shall
citizenship]
governing
[those
title
paragraph (20 of section 1408 of this
of the date of birth to a person born out of wedlock if and
(1) a blood relationship between the person and the father is established by clear
evidence,
convincing
26
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foreign-born illegitimate child of an American father can do nothing to obtain
statutory jus sanguinis citizenship, while the same child of an American
mother may claim this statutory birthright citizenship at any time because it
27
exists retroactive to birth.
From the immigration law perspective, the Miller case presented the

Supreme Court with an opportunity to revisit troubling jurisprudence limiting
the application of constitutional rights to aliens. In Fiallo v. Bell,2 8 the Court
had refused to apply gender-based heightened scrutiny to immigration cases
because immigrants are aliens, not citizens, and are therefore not wellprotected by the Bill of Rights. 29 Instead, in immigration cases, the Court
required statutes to pass a lower "facially legitimate and bona fide reason"
standard, roughly equivalent to a rational basis test.30 The Court justified this
lesser constitutional protection by reasoning that Congress has broad plenary
power to regulate the treatment of aliens. 31 The law in question in Fiallo,
however, dealt with disparate preferential immigration status, whereas Miller
addressed the citizenship status of foreign-born children based on the sex of
32
their American parent.
(2) the father had the nationality of the United States at the time of the person's
birth,
(3) the father (unless deceased) has agreed in writing to provide financial support for
the person until the person reaches the age of 18 years, and
(4) while the person is under the age of 18 years(A) the person is legitimated under the law of the person's residence or domicile,
(B) the father acknowledges paternity of the person in writing under oath, or
(C) the paternity of the person is established by adjudication of a competent court.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in section 405 of this Act, the provision of Section
1401(g) 'of this title shall apply to a child born out of wedlock on or after January 13,
1941, and before December 24, 1952, as of the date of birth, if the paternity of such
child is established at any time while such child is under the age of twenty-one years by
legitimation.
(c) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section, a person born ...
outside of the United States and out of wedlock shall be held to have acquired at birth
the nationality status of his mother, if the mother had the nationality status of the
United States at the time of such person's birth, and if the mother had previously been
physically present in the United States... for a continuous period of one year.
8 U.S.C. § 1049(a)-(c).
27 See id. § 1049(c).
28 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
29 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794.
30 See, e.g., Ablong v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1995) (equating the factually
legitimate and bona fide reason test with the rational basis test); Azizi v. Thornburg, 908
F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying the rational basis test to the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendments).
31 See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) ("In the exercise of its broad
power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rule that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.").
32 See Fiallo,430 U.S. at 791.
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Numerous immigration law experts have questioned the application of lower
33
constitutional standards to aliens. As a result, immigration scholars focused
on the Miller case because it, unlike Fiallo, presented an opportunity to
provide the plaintiff alien with the protection of the Bill of Rights. In Miller,
the plaintiffs argued that if the Immigration and Nationality Act violated the
equal protection clause's heightened scrutiny test, Lorelyn Miller could claim
citizenship retroactive to birth. As a citizen, Lorelyn Miller would therefore
enjoy the protection of the Bill of Rights, including that very heightened
scrutiny. 34 Thus, the Miller plaintiffs argued that heightened scrutiny did apply
because Lorelyn Miller was ostensibly in the position of a citizen when
challenging the statute that would make her a citizen if only it were
constitutionally sound. Furthermore, Miller argued that the gender distinction
in this statute failed the heightened scrutiny test even if it could pass the lower
Constitutional standard applied to aliens. Thus, the case presented a pressing
question of immigration law norms with respect to Congress's plenary
powers. 35 Because the Supreme Court was primarily interested in resolving
this issue, it occupied the foreground in the Miller opinions. The Court did
not, however, provide a thorough examination of the possible impact on family
law of holding that this statute, which treated mothers and fathers differently,
violated equal protection rights.
In the end, the Supreme Court declared Section 309 constitutional and
denied Lorelyn Miller citizenship. The actual opinions in Miller, however,
were so numerous and fractured on the various issues that no single holding
can be taken away from the case. Six Justices voted in favor of the
Government, but that majority divided into three written opinions, each of
which commanded only two votes. Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, announcing the majority judgment, 36believed Lorelyn Miller had
passed
standing to challenge the statute as a citizen, but that the statute
37
situated.
differently
are
fathers
and
mothers
because
heightened scrutiny
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy concurred in the judgment. They conceded
33 See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity:
Championing Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Battle of Plenary

Power Versus Aliens' Rights, 41 VILL. L. REv. 725 (1996) (criticizing the extent of the
federal government's plenary power over immigration and recommending a constitutionally
humane approach toward creating policies which affect aliens).
34 See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 427 (1998).
31 For a clear discussion of how great the implications of Miller are for Congress's
plenary powers over immigration, see The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra note 12,
at 202-12.
36 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 432-33.
31 See id. at 437-45 ("When a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States,
the citizen mother, unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of her child's existence and
typically will have custody of the child immediately after birth .... By contrast, due to the
normal interval of nine months between conception and birth, the unmarried father may not
even know that his child exists, and the child may not know the father's identity.").
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that the statute probably failed heightened scrutiny. 38 However, their
concurrence rested on the standing issue; they thought that Lorelyn Miller's
claim was merely derivative of her father's claim, and that she should not be
granted third-party standing to assert her father's rights because he had the
opportunity to stay in the case and assert his own rights. 39 Justices Scalia and
Thomas, also concurring in the judgment, did not discuss the merits of the
case. Instead, they argued that the Court could grant no relief because
Congress's plenary powers over immigration are so great that a court could
never grant citizenship except by the exact terms set out by Congress. n0 In her
dissent, Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer and Souter, argued that
heightened scrutiny applies, and argued at great length that the statute failed
under that test.4 1 In another dissenting opinion signed by Justices Ginsburg
and Souter, Justice Breyer agreed that the statute should fail heightened
scrutiny, but elaborated on the ways in which the Court could justify the use of
42
heightened scrutiny in this case.
As to the gender question-whether mothers and fathers must be treated
identically with respect to parent-child issues under the equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution-the Justices who voted with the majority in
the government's favor did not reach consensus on the issue. The three
43
dissenting Justices, however, did see an equal protection violation.
Moreover, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy also identified a probable equal
protection violation, though they voted with the majority based on the standing
issue. 44 Thus, if one can speculate about future Supreme Court voting based
on the Miller opinions, it appears that the Court may actually have five votes in
favor of prohibiting disparate treatment of mothers and fathers.
Although this vote count is obviously non-binding at present, if repeated in a
properly presented case, it would constitute an apparent departure from prior
Supreme Court case law on the issue of sex-based disparate treatment of

38

See id. at 451 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that Section 309 passes

rational scrutiny).
31 See id. at 445-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) ("The statute.., accords
differential treatment to fathers and mothers, not to sons and daughters. Thus, although
[Lorelyn Miller] is clearly injured by the fact that she has been denied citizenship, the
discriminatoryimpact of the provision falls on [her] father.., who is no longer a party to
the suit. Consequently ....[the Court] should [not] consider [Lorelyn Miller's] gender
discrimination claim.").
40 See id. at 452-59 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that "the Court has no
power to provide the relief requested" because that power rested in Congress).
41 See id. at 460-70 (Ginsberg, J.,
dissenting) (remarking that "[iut is unlikely... that any
gender classifications based on stereotypes can survive heightened scrutiny").
42 See id. at 471-90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting that there is no statutory history
or case law that could justify a more lenient standard of review than heightened scrutiny).
41 See id. at 469-71, 481-90.
" See id. at 451-52.
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45
parents. For example, in Lehr v. Robertson, Justice Stevens authored a
majority opinion for the Court which upheld a statute although it permitted the
adoption of a child without giving a somewhat uninvolved biological father
in all cases. 46
notice and a right to be heard, while giving mothers those rights
Justice Stevens supported this holding by arguing that mothers and fathers are
differently situated because mothers commit to their children when they decide
to carry a pregnancy to term rather than terminate it, and further, that they
work for the benefit of the child through childbirth, while men are not
47
their children.
biologically compelled to take any responsibility for
Therefore, the majority opinion held that this automatic responsibility for
children justifies a statutory grant of greater decision-making authority to
mothers. 48 The Court's five votes in Miller, however, may signal a future
conflict with that prior case law, instead favoring identical treatment of
mothers and fathers. This potential shift in the Court's voting on paternity
issues demands serious attention from family law scholars.

II. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS VERSUS FAMILY RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

As noted above, the standing issue was decisive to the outcome of the Miller
case. Two Justices who voted with the majority would likely have joined the
three dissenting Justices in voting for the plaintiff if they had not felt that
Lorelyn Miller's interests, when carefully separated from her father's, were
inadequate to. give her standing to raise an equal protection challenge. Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy believed that Lorelyn Miller had no standing to raise
an equal protection claim based on gender because the gender distinction in
49
question applied to her father rather than directly to her. Lorelyn Miller, as a
child rather than a parent, could not claim sex discrimination, but instead had
50
to rely on her father to raise the claim on his own behalf. Absent the father's
claim, Lorelyn Miller had no gender claim on her own and no alternative
avenue to pursue one. From a family law perspective, however, the interests of
both the father and daughter cannot meaningfully be separated because the
45 463 U.S. 248 (1983).

See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 (deciding the constitutionality of N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§
190, 197-99 (1976)).
47 See id. at 260, n.16.
48 Justice Stevens had maintained this view through earlier paternity rights cases, see
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting), but it was not until
Lehr that his view won a majority of votes.
49 Male and female children, in other words, are treated identically under the statute,
which only distinguishes between male and female parents. See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S.
420, 445-61; supranotes 47-48 and accompanying text.
50 Although Lorelyn Miller's father did raise this claim, he was dismissed from the case
erroneously. See id. at 448 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Her father did not
appeal that decision, although the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court both found the dismissal
erroneous.
46
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statute has as its purpose the protection of the relationship between them. If
the Miller litigation had focused more decisively on the family law aspects of
the case, a decision not to separate the child's interests from the parent's might
have resulted, changing the outcome of the case.
A majority of the Justices would have granted Lorelyn Miller third-party
standing to assert her father's rights under the general rules of third-party
standing. 51 They were not, however, a group that could rally five votes on the
substantive outcome of the case. Among those who agreed with the final
disposition of the case in favor of the government were the critical two votes,
O'Connor and Kennedy. Moreover, the remaining Justices agreed that the
statute violated the father's rather than the daughter's rights; they simply
believed that the daughter could assert his rights as a third party. 52 Thus, the
entire Court agreed that a child's rights are not violated when her parents are
subjected to sex-based disparate treatment. This position, which is contestable
from a family law perspective, exemplifies the disconnection between regular
constitutional decision-making and regular discourse within family law.
In general, the Supreme Court examines constitutional fights as belonging to
individuals who may assert them against the state. 53 This analytical structure,
however, is not always helpful when considering the rights of family members.
It is just as easy to conceive of the interest at stake in the Miller case as an
interest in the establishment or maintenance of a parent-child relationship, with
all its opportunities and responsibilities, as it is to conceive of each individual's
stake in the relationship. In Miller, the government argued that cultivation of
the parent-child relationship was one of the primary purposes of the Section
309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 54 Thus, while the individuallyheld rights analysis is coherent, an alternative analysis focusing on the parentchild relationship may have proved more useful.
Scholars of feminist legal theory have developed an extensive body of
literature questioning assumptions of autonomy in legal analysis. 55 Family
51Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter constituted
this majority. See Miller, 523 U.S. 420 (1998). As set out in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
411 (1991), a person can have third party standing to assert someone else's claim when: (1)
that person has suffered injury in fact, (2) the party and the other person have a close
relationship, and (3) there was some hindrance to the other person asserting his or her own
rights.
52 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 432-33.
13 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1971) ("If [a] right.., means
anything, it is the right of the individual... to be free from unwarranted governmental
").
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person ....
14 See Brief for Respondent at 24-3 1, Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (No. 90-567).
55 See Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS
162 (1990) [hereinafter Nedelsky, Boundaries] (arguing that individual autonomy is "a
wrong-headed and destructive way of conceiving of the human creatures for whom laws and
government are created ....What actually makes human autonomy possible is not
");Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving
isolation, but relationships, first with parents ....
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relations, particularly the parent-child relationship, pose the most acute
problem for these theorists. 56 Even some of those theorists who are amenable
to individual rights in some legal contexts question the utility of this approach
in analyzing the parent-child relationship. 57 These scholars propose instead that
the courts evaluate laws for their effect on the parent-child relationship instead
of focusing exclusively on the impact on individual family members. 58 Some
family law practices appear to take this approach as well. 59
Bringing the relational approach favored by some family law scholars to
bear on the admittedly individual rights protected by the Constitution, one
would ask whether Lorelyn Miller was subjected to sex discrimination when
statutory privileges arising from her parental relationship differed on the basis
of the citizen-parent's sex. Although this would constitute an unusual approach
to examining the constitutionality of a statute, it is not unprecedented. In
Loving v. Virginia,60 the State of Virginia argued that there was no racediscrimination in a law criminalizing miscegenation: the individuals were

treated the same whether black or white, because both were prevented from

Autonomy, 1 YALE J.L. FEM. 7 (1989) [hereinafter Nedelsky, Autonomy] ("If we ask
ourselves what actually enables people to be autonomous, the answer is not isolation, but
relationships-with parents .... "); Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. CH. L.'
REv. 1 (1988) (examining the differences in societal bonds between men and women).
56 See, e.g., Pamela Scheininger, Legal Separateness, Private Connectedness: An
Impediment to Gender Equality in the Family, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 283 (1998)
("Essentially, when the courts are considering the application of the law to a man or a
women, they do not conceive of such individuals as mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, sons,
or daughters, but rather as independent and unattached legal subjects."); Nedelsky,
Autonomy, supra note 55, at 12; Nedelsky, Boundaries, supra note 55, at 169.
17 See, e.g., Katharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 295-96
(1989) ("Legal disputes over parenthood are an example of how the presentation of claims
in terms of individual rights may force controversies into a framework that misstates the
harm to be avoided and undermines the values we should promote.").
5 See id. at 294-95 (proposing that using a relational approach would "express a better
view of parenthood" and would affect both the approach to family-based litigation and the
"construction of the parent-child relationship"); Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Father'sRights,
Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 60 (1995) ("An individual can exercise a parental right, but the existence or
the nature of the right cannot be explained by reference to the individual alone.").
59 For example, custody determinations do not simply evaluate the fitness of a parent, but
the relationship between a parent and a child and the merits of the parent for that particular
child. When deciding whether a family may relocate away from a noncustodial parent, thus
interfering with regular visitation, courts ask what is in the best interest of the entire family,
not each individual within it. Countless laws, ranging from tax to creditor-debtor, seek to
protect the family as one financial unit, not as a set of individuals, even if some individuals
would receive better treatment if separated out. Not all laws affecting the family take this
approach, but the approach is certainly familiar within the field.
60 388 U.S. 1 (1966).
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marrying a person of the opposite race regardless of their own.6 1 Of course,
the Supreme Court saw the nonsense in this argument and declared the statute
unconstitutional. 62 However, one must examine a relationship between two
people to reveal fully the extent of the racial discrimination in the
miscegenation laws. 63 In Loving, the underlying statute, a marriage regulation,
dealt in the very material of relationships; the Court could not ignore the
substance of the statute.64 Thus, this slightly unusual turn in Equal Protection
jurisprudence resembles the formal analysis applied to a right of association
violation, which is explicitly contingent on relations with others, more than it
resembles the analysis applied to a violation of individual rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Similarly, the statute in question in Miller,
which bestowed benefits on children based on the citizenship of their parents,
also deals in the material of relationships, not individuals. This statute, which
was created for the protection of the parent/child relationship, begs for a
substantive rather than formalistic analysis.
How might the Loving approach have helped in the Miller analysis? While
Justice O'Connor's approach to standing is coherent, there is another avenue
for permitting Lorelyn Miller to have made a sex discrimination claim.
Section 309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, a statute aimed at
protecting the parent-child relationship, provides greater protection for one
parent-child relationship than another based on the sex of the parent in
question. Sex-based stereotypes about parent-child relationships, not just
about parents, constrained Lorelyn Miller's opportunity to defy gender
stereotypes in family relationships with her parents. 65 Although the majority
of Justices on the Court recognized Lorelyn Miller's standing to assert her
father's claim, this decision merely constituted a pragmatic legal device for
allowing the case to proceed with Lorelyn Miller as the only plaintiff. Had the
Court taken a family-law perspective on the standing issue, it might have found
that Lorelyn Miller, as part of the disfavored father-daughter relationship, had
her own sex-based equal protection claim, just as a party to a disfavored
interracial relationship has a claim in Loving. Although this argument has
practical vulnerabilities that may have led to its rejection by the Court,66 the
See Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-13.
Seeid. at 11-12.
63 See Shanley, supra note 58, at 66 n.20 (arguing that some rights that pertain to
individuals cannot be properly understood unless they are understood as pertaining to the
individual in relation to others).
61 The Loving Court found the statute in question unconstitutional because it impinged on
the ability of two persons to engage in a relationship. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
65 In Miller, Justice Breyer did note that "[tihis Court, I assume, would use heightened
scrutiny were it to review discriminatory laws based on ancestry. [A]nd if that is so, I am
not certain that it makes a significant difference whether one calls the rights at issue those of
Lorelyn or of her father." See Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 476 (1998).
66 At times there are clear distinctions, and even conflicts, between parents' and
children's interests.
61
62
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parties did not even raise the argument, nor did the Justices address it. These
omissions may have stemmed from unfamiliarity with family law discourse; in
particular, from a lack of awareness of different approaches to analyzing the
parent-child relationship.
HI. FORMAL EQUALITY VERSUS GENDERED PARENTING ROLES

Outside of the family law context, gender equality questions have become
fairly simple under the Constitution, particularly in the wake of the "VMI"
case. 67 Virtually no gender distinction survives the charge that differences
between men and women are primarily a matter of averages, are socially
imposed and should not therefore be legally perpetuated, and are an affront to
individual dignity because they constrain the identity of the nonconforming
69

individual. 68 This perspective, often labeled "the formal equality approach,
7
has fueled the second-wave feminist legal reforms behind Title VII and Title
71
IX, as well as behind equal protection jurisprudence. Furthermore, after the
Miller case-if one can learn anything from adding up majority and dissenting
dicta on a sub-issue in a case decided on other grounds-formal equality will
72
also decide the next paternity case presented to the Supreme Court. Although
this may seem uncontroversial to the constitutional law scholar at large, within
family law scholarship and practice, many who identify themselves as
supporting women's efforts at achieving real legal equality have expressed
substantial skepticism of formal equality claims in paternal rights cases.
67 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (noting that "inherent differences

between men and women... remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the
members of either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual's opportunity").
68 See id. at 533.
69 See, e.g., Silvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, in FEMINIST
JURISPRUDENCE 82-88 (Mary Becker et al. eds., 1994) (noting that "formal equality"
suggests that "the appropriate function of the law is not to enforce a general vision of what
men and women are really like but rather to respect each person's authority to define herself
or himself, free from sex-defined legal constraints").
70 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a) (West 1988). Title VII mandates that an individual's sex
shall not be grounds for discrimination in hiring, discharge, compensation, and terms or
conditions of employment. The statute also requires employers to give women and
minorities equal opportunity to compete with men and non-minorities in matters relating to
employment. See id.
71 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (West 1999) ("No person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance.").
72 Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer all expressed the view that
the kind of legislative distinctions between mothers and fathers that survived scrutiny in
Lehr probably would no longer survive a properly presented equal protection challenge. See
Miller, 523 U.S. at 451-52, 460-71. For Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, the
standing issue in the Miller case obstructed consideration of this question. See supra note
39 and accompanying text.
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There are two complicating aspects of the equal protection challenge in
Miller that were not addressed during its litigation. The first deals with
whether or not fathers and mothers are actually similarly situated as parents, a
73
The second and
point raised and dismissed in some of the Miller opinions.
a neat line
draw
can
one
more complex gender equality issue is whether
if not, who
and
between the rights and the responsibilities conferred by law,
This
well-rehearsed
benefits from rights conferred along with responsibilities.
debate within family law is not visible in the text of most of the prior Supreme
Court paternity opinions, and is likewise absent from the Miller dialogue.
A. Formal Equality and the Comparative Situation of Mothers and Fathers
Nowhere is the case against formal equality muddied more than when
dealing with questions of role identification for mothers and fathers. While
most scholars acknowledge that the form and intensity of the commitment and
participation of fathers varies widely from man to man, such that stereotypes of
logic sits less
men as parents can be particularly constrictive, that same
74
reluctance,7 5
or
comfort
of
degrees
various
With
mothers.
comfortably for
many in the family law field have come to the conclusion that the intensity of
maternal commitment is, on average, greater than paternal commitment, and
more significantly, that variation is far less common among mothers than
among fathers. Thus, although it is difficult to speak broadly about the role of
a father, in candid moments it is far easier to generalize about certain aspects
of motherhood, particularly default responsibility for childrearing should

13 See,

e.g., id. at 433-45 ("There is... a vast difference between the burdens imposed
on the respective parents of potential citizens born out of wedlock in a foreign land."); see
dissenting) (recognizing that although mothers and fathers may
id. at 468-71 (Ginsberg, J.,
"when the Government controls gates to opportunity, it may
situated,
be
differently
typically
not exclude qualified individuals based on fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of
males and females.").
74 See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY 44-54, 7089 (1994) (criticizing "[t]he law's reluctance to recognize and accommodate the uniqueness
); Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo,
of Mother's role in child rearing ....
And Child Custody, I S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133 (1992) ("[M]others are
usually emotionally closer to their children than fathers.") [hereinafter Becker, Maternal
Feelings]; Mary Becker, The Rights of Unwed Parents: Feminist Approaches 1989 Soc.
SERV. REV. 496, 500-03, 508 ("[F]athers appear to feel more separate from newborns than
do mothers.") [hereinafter Becker, Unwed Parents]; Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v.
Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L. 1, 23-38 (1998) ("Parenthood... is a situation in which
men and women are clearly not similarly situated biologically ...[or] in terms of social
reality." (citations omitted)).
75See Mary L. Shanley, supra note 58, at 88-89 (noting that biological differences
between men and women may facilitate a closer caregiving relationship between mothers
and their children); see also Joan Williams, Do Women Need Special Treatment? Do
Feminists Need Equality?, 1 J. CONTEMp. LEGAL ISSUES 279 312 (1998).
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shared parenting fail, and intense emotional involvement with children. 76
Furthermore, although one cannot speak universally about motherhood because
mothers are on occasion detached from their children, 77 the great difference of
averages has posed a serious challenge to family law scholars. At what point is
the harm from ignoring the overwhelming average differences between fathers
and mothers worse than the harm arising from acknowledging it? Although all
gender-based equal protection challenges could arguably raise this concern,
none do so with greater magnitude than those addressing the roles of parents.
Some people claim that differences in parental involvement stem from
biological differences. This argument, made succinctly by Justice Stevens in
Lehr v. Robertson,78 is that a woman commits to a fetus in utero when she
decides to carry the pregnancy to term instead of terminating it. 79 A man
makes no comparable commitment, and until he makes some compensating
efforts on a par with the mother's, he does not receive equal rights to make
decisions about the child. 80 Moreover, a woman is, by necessity, present at the
birth of her child, and must thus make initial decisions and provisions for the
baby. A father may or may not attend the birth-this decision is largely
elective for him, and thus his responsibility is less immediate. Because
mothers and fathers are not similarly situated in this regard, there is as yet no
equal protection mandate for identical treatment. This biological approach
parallels the Supreme Court's reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello:8' pregnancy
distinguishes men and women, and the law need not treat such differently
situated individuals identically. 82 The difficult question is how far to extend
this concept after birth, given the diminished role of biological determinism
83
post-birth.
Within family law, experience, trial and error, and extensive debate have
76 See Becker, Maternal Feelings, supra note 74, at 143 ("most women feel differently

about their babies-more strongly, more intensely-than most men").
77 For a provocative discussion of the legal response to aberrant mothering, see Dorothy
Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95 (1993) (examining the effect of legal
rules that "reward" society's expectation that a woman fulfill her maternal role, and "punish
conduct that conflicts with mothering").
78

463 U.S. 248 (1983).
id. at 250.

79 See

81 See, e.g., id. at 260 n.16 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979)
(Stewart, J. dissenting) in stating that "[t]he mother carries and bears the child and in this
sense her parental relationship is clear. .. [but] [tihe validity of the father's parental claims
must be gauged by other measures).
81417 U.S. 484 (1974) (denying a challenge by four pregnant women against
California's disability insurance system).
82 See id. at 487.
83 As long as an infant is nursing, of course, there is still a biological distinction between
mothers and fathers. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends that infants should
be breastfed for at least one year. See AAP Releases New Breastfeeding Recommendations
(visited Oct. 18, 1999) <http://www.aap.org/advocacy/archives/decbre.html>.
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parsed the discussion into roles (e.g., primary caregiver, breadwinner), versus
identities (male and female), and weighed the positive and negative attributes
of each. Practice has shown the difference between situations that can better
afford an ideal of formal equality and those that pay a more significant price
for it. Given the pervasiveness of certain "stereotypes," such as initial
maternal custody of, and responsibility for, a newborn baby, laws that pretend
that fathers and mothers of newborns are similarly situated can do real harm in
some cases. State laws, for example, seek to facilitate the placement of
newborns for adoption as quickly as possible. Because mothers are easier to
find than fathers and are usually in the position of physical responsibility for a
newborn, most states distinguish mothers from fathers in conferring decisionmaking authority over adoptions. 84 In opposing such laws, formal equality
advocates before the Supreme Court have generally minimized their context by
assuming that parental roles are simply one more instantiation of oppressive
gender stereotypes, the relief of which would tend to the general good. Family
law practices that have afforded unwed mothers of newborns more decisionto
making authority in adoptions than unwed fathers have done so in response
85 In
adoptions.
newborn
routine
surrounding
situations
practical
very
the
almost every newborn adoption case, the mother is the immediate custodial
parent under circumstances that have forced her, willingly or not, to take
86
responsibility for thinking about the newborn's future. The father may in fact
also be thinking about the newborn's future, but nothing in biology, culture or
law requires his participation.
The apparent lack of awareness of this debate outside the realm of family
law practitioners and scholars is illustrated by the amicus brief submitted by
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") and NOW Legal Defense and

8 Although mothers have more direct control over adoption decisions, the adoption laws
do not extinguish fathers' decision-making authority entirely. The Lehr decision requires
that unwed fathers have at least one avenue to speak about adoption decisions, though it
permits states to give mothers more numerous and flexible avenues. See Lehr v. Robertson,

463 U.S. 248,263-65 (1983).
11 See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1081-83, 1086-88, 1389-90 (explaining why
fathers may be afforded less legal protection).
86 Newborn adoptions occur when a child's parents decide that they are unwilling,
usually because they are in some sense unable to raise a child. The circumstances of such
parents in most cases include being unmarried. A mother of a newborn in this situation is
often young, and often has inadequate support structures to raise the child. This can mean
inadequate finances, inadequate support from her own family, and an absent father of the
child. This last circumstance, present in many newborn adoption cases, presents the
difficulty in formulating state adoption laws. A mother who is physically absent after the
birth of a child is so rare that it almost always warrants mention in the newspaper, as when
babies are abandoned on church steps or in hotel rooms. A father who is absent at and takes
no responsibility for the birth of a child is commonplace enough to be considered a major
public policy issue. The parents of newborns are thus often differently situated in cases
where a child is given up for adoption.
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Education Fund in the Miller case.8 7 It speaks of the roles of mothers and
fathers in an almost cartoonish way. The picture painted is of a very modem
world in which gendered parenting roles are no longer the norm, in which all

that can be said of parenting is that it is too heterogeneous to make any
gendered claims. 88 The ACLU cites data on women's increased participation
in the workforce, apparently expecting the Court to assume that this increased
participation must have brought with it role reversals in the home. 89 This may
accurately reflect parenting in the popular imagination, but it is not supported
by empirical evidence. 90 In a telling display of disinterest in the relationship
between fact and the popular imagination, the ACLU cites television shows,
movies, and television advertisements as source material for the claim that
fathers often parent just like mothers. 9' It may be the case that all things

carefully considered, a gender-neutral approach to parenting is the best
constitutional standard. However, the ACLU brief shows a disturbing lack of
experience with the depth of the debate on this question within family law, and
its process of arriving at the conclusion that parenting is a sex-neutral practice
92
should give no one comfort.
See Brief of Amici Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union and NOW Legal
Defense and Education Fund in Support of Petitioners [hereinafter ACLU Brief] at 7-10,
87

Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (No. 96-1060) (reviewing studies that show that parenting
success is not a function of gender).
88 See id. (citing studies that say fathers "can be" as effective at parenting as mothers,
with no effort to demonstrate whether there are changes with respect to who in fact serves as
primary caregiver).
89 In fact, after citing studies about women in the workforce, the brief states, "As a direct
result of this movement of women into the workforce, fathers have become more active
participants in childcare for reasons of both choice and necessity." Id. However, the brief
cites nothing to support the veracity of this potentially related claim.
I See, e.g, Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91
Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 8-13 (1996) (discussing sociological studies comparing the number of
hours of housework that women perform to the number that men perform).
91 See ACLU Brief, supra note 87, at 9 (commenting on the role of men as caring parents
as portrayed through popular culture).
92 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's approach in her dissent in Miller is less na've. She
makes no claim against averages, but instead acknowledges that the stereotype of concerned
and involved mothers being more prevalent than concerned and involved fathers is probably
based in empirically-demonstrable averages. "One can demur to the Government's
observation that more United States citizen mothers of children born abroad out of wedlock
actually raise their children than do United States citizen fathers of such children." Miller,
523 U.S. at 470 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Instead, she is concerned with outliers. In
answer to the claim that men usually take less responsibility for children than women, she
quotes the Congressional testimony of one woman who said, "[w]hether there are a lot of
people who suffer or whether there are a few who suffer, it seems to us that the principle of
equal application of the law to men and women ought to receive recognition." Id. Her
opinion shows an understanding of the debate, although she chooses a different position
within it than does Justice Stevens.
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My argument is not that maternalists within family law are ultimately
correct, or that there is no way to make a sophisticated case for equal parenting
roles. It is only that the Miller case, and the paternity cases that precede it, do
not display comprehension of their impact on family law practice, and at times
the radical departure from well-reasoned family law practices, that their formal
equality approach could signal. The concern from within family law is not that
there is a resounding consensus against the formal equality approach. It is
instead that constitutionalizing the formal equality approach closes down the
debate and prevents further experimentation.
State legislatures' approaches to the constitutional imperative to grant rights
to fathers in adoption cases present an interesting expression of the dialogue
between the Supreme Court and the family law community of scholars and
practitioners. States must accept that the Supreme Court has instructed them to
provide all fathers some unilateral mechanism for informing the State that they
wish to play a role in adoption decisions. 93 However, one could hardly
characterize the response in many states as a legislative embrace of an equal
parenting norm. Instead, many states have constructed statutes that provide the
constitutionally bare minimum opportunity for a father to voice his interest
through a putative father registry. 94 Putative father registries, whereby a
potential father can send a postcard to the state registering as a possible father
of a child still in utero, at a minimum secure for that father notice and hearing
rights in any adoption proceeding involving that child. However, they defy
any common understanding of what a concerned father who wanted to
establish contact with his child would do; in fact, in the absence of legal
advice, it is hard to imagine any father knowing that this action was required of
him if he wished to preserve his rights. Putative father registries may be
justified by the need for expedient placement of newborn children for
adoption. But their popularity demonstrates that the family law bar, whose
views are reflected in state family law legislation, views the practical questions
associated with the differences between mothers and fathers as far more
important than the symbolic ones associated with avoiding stereotypes. On
this issue, family law scholars and policymakers usually have preferred
reforms that facilitate speedy adoptions and reflect gender fairness on the facts
of the overwhelming majority of cases to reforms that put fathers and mothers
on an identical footing but may slow the process of newborn adoptions.
This debate is reflected in Justice Stevens' past opinions favoring laws that
allow mothers to decide, over fathers' objections, whether adoption is in the
best interest of a child. But the Miller case nicely poses the risks associated
with that reasoning: the citizenship law in Miller in no way assists mothers at
9 See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263-65 (1983).
9 At least 14 states have putative father registries. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 4, at
1081 (identifying putative father registries in Arkansas, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan,
Montana, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
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the expense of fathers. Instead, it penalizes children for the gendered division
of family labor.95 As a result, the Miller case reveals a serious problem with
Justice Stevens's jurisprudence of maternal and paternal difference. While
many have debated whether his jurisprudence can be, defended as the
constitutionalization of stereotypes, others have praised his willingness to look

96
beyond the pretense of parental gender neutrality. Justice Stevens gives little
notice, however, to a deeper issue. His reasoning fails to address the
inextricable link between granting parental rights and assigning parental
responsibilities, and by failing to do so, perpetuates the uneven allocation of
responsibilities at law between mothers and fathers.

B. Rights versus Responsibilitiesand Equal ProtectionBased on Gender

In his plurality opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Miller,
Justice Stevens repeated a line of reasoning about mothers and fathers that he
has pursued for twenty years. He has repeatedly argued that laws may
discriminate in favor of mothers, given their different position vis-A-vis their
children. 97 In this sense, Justice Stevens has in the past appeared to display a
95I suppose one could set it up as a contest between fathers and mothers as follows:
assume a limited number of citizenships that will be granted this way. Then ask who should
get them, the children of mothers, of fathers, or of both on an equal basis? To get them both
on an equal basis, some citizenships would need to be taken away from the children of U.S.
mothers and redistributed to those of U.S. fathers, such that the same requirements on both
would yield a constant number of citizenships granted. This seems a fairly specious
argument, however, as there is no reason to think that Congress intends a particular quota on
this type of citizen.
7, at
96 The literature on this issue is expansive. A sampling includes: Brinig, supra note
pregnant
a
of
rights
and
autonomy
the
toward
move
271 (arguing that the Supreme Court's
woman has weakened the nuclear family unit); Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional
Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L. J. 313, 315
(1984) (analyzing state termination of parental interests in children during adoption
proceedings); June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New
Model of Parental Partnership,39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1091, 1096 (1999) (arguing for a
redefinition of "fatherhood"); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Strugglefor
Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 1415 (1991) (discussing how family law treats
mothers and fathers differently); Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: JudicialAssumptions About
Parenthood,40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 694 (1993) (noting the biological differences between
maternity and paternity); Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathersand'Adoption: A Theoretical
Analysis in Context, 72 TEx. L. REv. 967, 979 (1994) (presenting the issue of unwed
fathers' rights in adoption); Shanley, supranote 58, at 74 (contrasting Justice Steven's view
with Justice Scalia's and Justice White's opinions, which are based on male-centered
models of parental rights).
97See, e.g., Miller, 523 U.S. at 445 ("The biological difference between single men and
single women provides a relevant basis for differing rules governing their ability to confer
citizenship on children born in foreign lands."); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 (stating that mothers
of illegitimate children have the right to veto an adoption and the right to prior notice of
adoption proceedings, but only fathers who have taken steps to establish their putative

1158

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1139

kind of feminist sensibility, protective of mothers' interests given
motherhood's unique work. Naturally, it is easy to dispute this form of
feminism as maternalist thinking that further embeds stereotypes. Nonetheless,
Justice Stevens' opinions have taken a tone that is sympathetic to the mothers
in these cases, exhibiting apparently less respect for the fathers.
However, past Supreme Court cases defining the scope of a father's rights
have taken the form of contests between the biological mother and the
biological father;98 they have consisted of attempts by the mother's husband
(the child's step-father), to adopt the child, thereby terminating the biological
father's rights. 99 This adoptionattempt is done with the mother's support, and
thus represents her interests pitted against those of the biological father.
Justice Stevens' attentiveness to the efforts made by mothers through
pregnancy and childbirth have apparently led to these legal rewards for
mothers at the expense of biological fathers.
In the Miller case, the absence of such a contest between parents highlights
a different issue: the difficulty of distinguishing the conferral of a right from
the conferral of a responsibility'. In other words, it is not simply the case that
right flows from taking responsibility; rather, giving right also gives
responsibility.
The father in Miller has portrayed the statute as one that gives rights to
mothers that it denies to fathers. But alternative perspectives are equally
possible. Mr. Miller was a serviceman stationed abroad, he impregnated a
local woman in the Philippines, and was able, with the assistance of the
citizenship rule in question in this case, to entirely ignore his child's existence
for twenty-one years. 100 The law gives him the privilege of escape from
paternal responsibility, as well as a privilege of conferring his citizenship if he
so chooses, before she turns eighteen. A mother enjoys an even simpler
avenue to confer the citizenship, should she so desire, and in this sense the law
favors her. But the law gives her no privilege of escaping her relationship with
her child comparable to that of the father. Instead, it confers on her the
parental responsibility of sharing a citizenship with her child, whatever her
preference may be. In family law scholarship, the notion that responsibility for
children is in part and at times a burden conferred by legal protection of a

fatherhood have similar rights); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 404 (1979) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) ("Men and women are different, and the difference is relevant to the question
of whether the mother may be given the exclusive right to consent to the adoption of a child
born out of wedlock.").
98 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 100, 113-16 (1989) Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250;
Caban, 441.U.S. at 381-82; Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247 (1978).
99 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250; Caban, 441 U.S. at 281-82; Quilloin,434 U.S. at 247.
'00 See Miller, 523 U.S. at 438-39 ("Mr. Miller and petitioner both failed to take any

steps to establish a legal relationship with each other before petitioner's twenty-first
birthday, and there is no indication in the record that they had any contact whatsoever before
she applied for a United States passport.").
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10 1
relationship with them is transparent, making its complete absence from the
Miller litigation a telling expression of the weaknesses of constitutional
declarations on the family.
Why deny mothers the privilege of escape conferred on fathers? The law
reflects what we suspect is true about mothers: they will not experience the
automatic conferral of United States citizenship on their children as a
deprivation of any kind of right or privilege of escape. Passing along
citizenship will always be a benefit to mothers, because it will always facilitate
the responsibility they will take for the parent-child relationship. This is
precisely the sexist assumption so disliked by formal equality advocates.
Meanwhile, many fathers, like Miller, will want to pass on citizenship, even if
it does, as it did in his case, follow twenty-one years of extreme paternal
neglect. Others will, so the assumption goes, prefer not to acknowledge or
take responsibility for children conceived while in the military stationed
abroad. No assumption about the facts of fatherhood tell us in a given case
whether the law is denying a right to pass citizenship or conferring the
privilege of avoiding paternal responsibility. Though hypothetically true of
mothers as well, it is so difficult to imagine mothers wanting to exercise the
right of escape that the possibility is invisible to the judicial or lawyerly eye
identifying the issues presented by the Miller case.
Here, the question of whether law confers rights or responsibilities entwines
the question of whether mothers and fathers are similarly situated. Surely it is
still an equal protection violation whether this law confers a responsibility
disparately on women, or instead confers a right disparately on them. It may
be, however, that the law facilitates, or even extends, the exercise of the greater
responsibility that women take for children as a result of women's pregnancy
and childbirth experiences.
If a biological difference exists that can rationalize a legal distinction
between maternity and paternity, can the law use that difference to facilitate
the creation of further differences between men's and women's relations to
children, differences that cannot be explained by the fact of childbirth or
pregnancy alone? Must the law limit the effects of differences rather than
facilitate the movement of their effects beyond what is necessary? Or must it
remain merely "neutral" in regulating around differences it finds immutable,
such as childbirth, neither facilitating nor limiting the spread of the effects of
those differences, and if so, what would neutral mean? I do not pretend to
answer these extremely difficult questions here. My argument is only that the
Court has failed completely to see these questions because it is first necessary
to see that the conferral of a right is also the conferral of a responsibility in this
citizenship statute. Awareness of that simultaneous conferral comes with

o See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 57, at 293 (stating that the law should base parenthood
more on established relationships and assumption of responsibility); Czapanskiy, supra note
96, at 1457-63 (arguing that family law in general permits fathers to volunteer for parenting,
while it drafts women into that responsibility).
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familiarity with the workings of family law.
CONCLUSION

Paternity litigation establishing constitutional rights has the effect of
curtailing debate, as does the constitutionalization of any right.102 Thus, it is
particularly important in the litigation of constitutional rights to have a
complete airing of the complexity of the legal field being constitutionalized.
With family law issues, the Court's attention to the debates within the
substantive field of law is not apparent. Instead, the complexity of the law of
families is passed over in the face of more time-honored constitutional
questions. The Miller case exemplifies this problem. In attentively examining
the rights of non-citizens under the Constitution, the Court passed too quickly
by issues that complicate the field of family law. Whether the airing of the
debates within family law would have produced a different result is less
important to this argument than whether the airing of family law debates would
have produced a better-reasoned opinion by the Court.
This year the Supreme Court will decide in Troxel v. Granville whether
statutes that grant third-parties visitation rights with a child over her legal
parents' objection violate the constitutional rights of legal parents. 103 As a
policy matter, there is much to say both in favor of and against these statutes,
which exist in almost every state. As states each find their own version of the
line between preserving a child's real relationships with other adults, and
preserving the decision-making authority and privacy of legal parents, their
legislatures and courts have created a wide variety in the text and interpretation
of these statutes. The Court should approach Troxel and future family law
cases with greater caution to avoid setting out constitutional prohibitions that
interfere with the give and take of experience and experimentation in the field
of family law.

102 See ROSENBERG,

supra note 1, at 9-26 (discussing the general impact that United
States courts have on society); Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy
Case for JudicialReview, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975, 976-77 (1993); (discussing the impact
of binding judicial review on women's issues).
103See, In re Smith, 969 P.2d 21 (1998), cert. granted sub nom Troxel v. Granville, 68
U.S.L.W. 3177 (Sept. 28, 1999).

